Several countries have reported every two years on activities undertaken by them with respect to promotion of research, development and exchange of information on best technologies, possible alternatives to controlled substances and costs and benefits of relevant control strategies and promoting public awareness.
|Year of submission:||1991|
Parties are invited to report to the Ozone Secretariat fully proved cases of illegal trade in ozone-depleting substances.
|Party||Seizure Date Year||Substances Traded||Volume||Importing Exporting Country||Illegal Trade Details||Action Taken||Remarks|
|Netherlands||2015||HCFC-22 CFC-12||Not specified||Trans-shipment from China to Russia via Netherlands||In July 2015 the Dutch Environmental Inspectorate has blocked in the Port of Rotterdam 2 containers with gas bottles containing refrigerants for further transport. From samples taken from the refrigerants it was shown that, despite their labelling as HFC’s (R-134a and R-407c) the bottles contained partly HCFC-22 and CFC-12|Legislation|According to the European Ozone Regulation (EC) No 1005/2009 and related Dutch national legislation such import of Ozone Depleting Substances is illegal and this ban on import is broadly formulated addressing everyone involved.||The Council of State of the Netherlands determined that in addition to the sender and receiver also a shipping company can be considered as offender of a legal ban on imports of ozone-depleting substances.|Cease and desist order. The Environmental Inspectorate considered all parties involved in this case as offenders and the Chinese supplier, the Russian addressee as well as the shipping company were all imposed with cease and desist orders requiring full destruction of all illegal ODS refrigerants and payment of storage costs conditional to a penalty. Eventually the shipping company appealed to this cease and desist order. |Shipping company’s view|The company’s position was that they were wrongly addressed as offender in this case and could not be blamed as they must be able to rely on the accuracy of the product information provided by the other parties involved. It cannot be expected from them to check the content of all gas bottles. They are suffering from the actions of the Chinese and Russian parties. |The Ruling |In its Ruling no 201706000/1/A1 from April 25, 2018, the Netherlands Council of State did not agree and puts the Environmental Inspectorate in the right. The import ban is also targeting a shipping company which can be therefor also considered as offender. Furthermore, from a professional carrier some research into the contents of the bottles can be expected. The Council of State also found important that it was a known smuggling route of ozone depleting substances. Furthermore, the carrier could check the gas cylinders in a relatively easy way through sampling.||Importance|This ruling is important because it facilitates the approach to address this kind of international smuggling activities. There are also more of this kind of broadly formulated prohibitions. So also for other areas this statement is of interest. Carriers will have to take their responsibilities and be more active in preventing violations of this kind of import bans. |Link to the full ruling of the NL Council of State (in Dutch): |http://www.raadvanstate.nl/uitspraken/zoeken-in-uitspraken/tekst-uitspraak.html?id=94929.|Annex to UNEP/OzL.Pro.30/INF/5|
|Netherlands||2007||carbon tetrachloride|CFC-113||3 kg|8 kg||Despite intended improvements in the internal procedures of the company involved (which had the year before been fined for unlicensed trade) two additional unlicensed transactions took place during 2007. In February 2007, 3 kg of carbon tetrachloride was exported to Switzerland and in June 2007 8 kg of CFC-113 was exported to Serbia.||The company stopped all exports of ozone-depleting substances.||Annex to UNEP/OzL.Pro.21/INF/5|
|Netherlands||2007||Methyl bromide||20,000 kg||Methyl bromide in the amount of 20,000 kg was exported to Israel during 2007.||Inspections revealed that the export resulted from a misapplication of the licensing system by the exporter and that there was no intention to mislead. Follow-up inspections are scheduled.||Annex to UNEP/OzL.Pro.21/INF/5|